The elimination of self-reference: Generalized Yablo-series and the theory of truth
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1028815 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2109238 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3099243 (Why is no real title available?)
- Circularity and paradox
- Essays in logical semantics
- Is Yablo's Paradox Liar-Like?
- Outline of a Theory of Truth
- Paradox without Self-Reference
- Patterns of paradox
- The knower paradox in the light of provability interpretations of modal logic
- Theories of truth which have no standard models
- What truth depends on
- Yablo's paradox
- Yablo's paradox and \(\omega\)-inconsistency
Cited in
(20)- Unwinding modal paradoxes on digraphs
- Yablo sequences in truth theories
- How to eliminate self-reference: a précis
- Super liars
- Boolean paradoxes and revision periods
- The elimination of direct self-reference
- What paradoxes depend on
- An entirely non-self-referential Yabloesque paradox
- Content Implication and the Yablo’s Sequent of Sentences
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2213632 (Why is no real title available?)
- Designing paradoxes: a revision-theoretic approach
- A graph-theoretic analysis of the semantic paradoxes
- Comments on Stephen Yablo's \textit{Aboutness}
- A UNIFIED THEORY OF TRUTH AND PARADOX
- Eliminating Self-Reference from Grelling's and Zwicker's Paradoxes
- Equiparadoxicality of Yablo's paradox and the liar
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2109238 (Why is no real title available?)
- ‘Sometime a paradox’, now proof: Yablo is not first order
- Dangerous reference graphs and semantic paradoxes
- Patterns of paradox
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