The elimination of self-reference: Generalized Yablo-series and the theory of truth

DOI10.1007/s10992-006-9035-xzbMath1121.03012OpenAlexW2049048600MaRDI QIDQ878231

Philippe Schlenker

Publication date: 26 April 2007

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-006-9035-x

zbMATH Keywords

generalized quantifiersemantic paradoxesself-referenceKripke's theory of truthYablo's paradoxquantificational languagesstrong Kleene logic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items (11)

Unwinding modal paradoxes on digraphs ⋮ Designing paradoxes: a revision-theoretic approach ⋮ Dangerous reference graphs and semantic paradoxes ⋮ Boolean paradoxes and revision periods ⋮ The elimination of direct self-reference ⋮ A UNIFIED THEORY OF TRUTH AND PARADOX ⋮ How to eliminate self-reference: a précis ⋮ Equiparadoxicality of Yablo's paradox and the liar ⋮ SUPER LIARS ⋮ What paradoxes depend on ⋮ Content Implication and the Yablo’s Sequent of Sentences

Cites Work

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• What truth depends on
• Essays in logical semantics
• The knower paradox in the light of provability interpretations of modal logic
• Yablo's paradox and \(\omega\)-inconsistency
• Yablo's paradox
• Paradox without Self-Reference
• Is Yablo's Paradox Liar-Like?
• Outline of a Theory of Truth
• Patterns of paradox
• Theories of truth which have no standard models

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