Theories of truth which have no standard models

DOI10.1023/A:1011950105814zbMath0991.03054OpenAlexW1828219877MaRDI QIDQ5951912

Hannes Leitgeb

Publication date: 29 August 2002

Published in: Studia Logica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1011950105814

zbMATH Keywords

nonstandard modelssemantically closed languages\(\omega\)-logicaxiomatic theories of truthMcGee's \(\omega\)-inconsistency result

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) First-order arithmetic and fragments (03F30) Nonstandard models of arithmetic (03H15) Gödel numberings and issues of incompleteness (03F40)

Related Items (7)

Yablo's paradox in second-order languages: consistency and unsatisfiability ⋮ The elimination of self-reference: Generalized Yablo-series and the theory of truth ⋮ Theories of truth without standard models and Yablo's sequences ⋮ Truth without standard models: some conceptual problems reloaded ⋮ Montague's paradox, informal provability, and explicit modal logic ⋮ ON THE PROBABILISTIC CONVENTION T ⋮ Possible-worlds semantics for modal notions conceived as predicates

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