ON THE PROBABILISTIC CONVENTION T

DOI10.1017/S1755020308080167zbMath1204.03010MaRDI QIDQ3580670

Hannes Leitgeb

Publication date: 13 August 2010

Published in: The Review of Symbolic Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

epistemic probability measuresepistemic theory of truthrational degree of beliefRevision Theory of Truth

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Related Items (6)

One hundred years of semantic paradox ⋮ Logic and social cognition. The facts matter, and so do computational models ⋮ Limits in the revision theory. More than just definite verdicts ⋮ Probability for the revision theory of truth ⋮ Guest editors' introduction ⋮ Notes on Leitgeb's Ruitenburg

Cites Work

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• Finitistic and frequentistic approximation of probability measures with or without \(\sigma\)-additivity
• Notes on naive semantics
• How truthlike can a predicate be? A negative result
• Probability semantics for quantifier logic
• A system of complete and consistent truth
• Outline of a Theory of Truth
• The liar paradox and fuzzy logic
• Functional analysis
• Theories of truth which have no standard models

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