Limits in the revision theory. More than just definite verdicts

DOI10.1007/s10992-018-9477-yzbMath1457.03009OpenAlexW2583021172MaRDI QIDQ2420711

Catrin Campbell-Moore

Publication date: 6 June 2019

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-018-9477-y

zbMATH Keywords

probabilityself-referencecircular definitionsrevision theorytaking limits

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Probability and inductive logic (03B48)

Related Items (2)

Designing paradoxes: a revision-theoretic approach ⋮ Probability for the revision theory of truth

Cites Work

• Notes on naive semantics
• How truthlike can a predicate be? A negative result
• Alternative revision theories of truth
• Truth and paradox
• Probability for the revision theory of truth
• ON THE PROBABILISTIC CONVENTION T
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