Accepting inconsistencies from the paradoxes
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Publication:795816
DOI10.1007/BF00453017zbMath0543.03005MaRDI QIDQ795816
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
non-triviality; fixed-point interpretation; liar sentence; monadic predicate; paradoxical sentences; Priest-interpretation; semantic closure; truth value gluts
03A05: Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations
03B50: Many-valued logic
03C50: Models with special properties (saturated, rigid, etc.)
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Logic of paradox revisited, Reasoning about truth, The Trivial Object and the Non-Uiviality of a Semantically Closed Theory with Descriptions
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