Accepting inconsistencies from the paradoxes (Q795816)

This paper investigates a suggestion of the reviewer [ibid. 8, 219-241 (1979; Zbl 0402.03012)] that paradoxical sentences, such as ''This sentence is false'', are both true and false. Let L be the first order language of arithmetic, augmented by a monadic predicate, T. The paper constructs a Priest-interpretation for L, which is an extension of the standard model of arithmetic and in which the extension of T is exactly the set of sentences true in the interpretation. The liar sentence is both true and false in the interpretation, but many sentences (including those of the language of arithmetic) are not both true and false. The construction proceeds by dualising a fixed-point interpretation of \textit{S. Kripke} [''Outline of a theory of truth'', J. Philos. 72, 690-716 (1975)] by, essentially, reinterpreting Kripke's ''neither true nor false'' as ''both true and false''. The reviewer comments on the paper in his paper reviewed above.