Intuitionism and the liar paradox

DOI10.1016/J.APAL.2012.01.014zbMATH Open1264.03031arXiv1004.2239OpenAlexW2963724946MaRDI QIDQ448337FDOQ448337

Nik Weaver

Publication date: 6 September 2012

Published in: Annals of Pure and Applied Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: The concept of informal mathematical proof considered in intuitionism is apparently vulnerable to a version of the liar paradox. However, a careful reevaluation of this concept reveals a subtle error whose correction blocks the contradiction. This leads to a general resolution of the classical semantic paradoxes. This paper is an expanded version of parts of my earlier paper "Constructive truth and circularity" [arXiv:0905.1681].

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1004.2239

zbMATH Keywords

liar paradoxsemantic paradoxesinternal model principleintuitionismformal mathematical proof

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Intuitionistic mathematics (03F55)

Cites Work

• Outline of a Theory of Truth
• Transfinite recursive progressions of axiomatic theories
• Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals^†
• Principles of intuitionism. Lectures presented at the summer conference on intuitionism and proof theory (1968) at SUNY at Buffalo, NY
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Cited In (4)

• Anti-intuitionism and paraconsistency
• Paradoxes, intuitionism, and proof-theoretic semantics
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