Intuitionism and the liar paradox

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Publication:448337

DOI10.1016/J.APAL.2012.01.014zbMATH Open1264.03031arXiv1004.2239OpenAlexW2963724946MaRDI QIDQ448337FDOQ448337


Authors: Nik Weaver Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 6 September 2012

Published in: Annals of Pure and Applied Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: The concept of informal mathematical proof considered in intuitionism is apparently vulnerable to a version of the liar paradox. However, a careful reevaluation of this concept reveals a subtle error whose correction blocks the contradiction. This leads to a general resolution of the classical semantic paradoxes. This paper is an expanded version of parts of my earlier paper "Constructive truth and circularity" [arXiv:0905.1681].


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1004.2239




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