Paradox and Inconsistency: Revising Tennant’s Distinction Through Schroeder-Heister’s Assumption Rules
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Publication:5213629
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-10434-8_7zbMath1429.03196OpenAlexW197207521MaRDI QIDQ5213629
Publication date: 4 February 2020
Published in: Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-10434-8_7
Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Proof theory in general (including proof-theoretic semantics) (03F03)
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