A new conditional for naive truth theory

DOI10.1215/00294527-1731407zbMath1273.03073MaRDI QIDQ1934956

Andrew Bacon

Publication date: 30 January 2013

Published in: Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://projecteuclid.org/euclid.ndjfl/1355494525

zbMATH Keywords

liar paradox; fixed-point theorem; truth theories; intersubstitutivity rule; self-referential contexts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

03A05: Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations

03B47: Substructural logics (including relevance, entailment, linear logic, Lambek calculus, BCK and BCI logics)

Related Items

BINARY KRIPKE SEMANTICS FOR A STRONG LOGIC FOR NAIVE TRUTH, Paths to triviality, Paradoxes of logical equivalence and identity, Non-deterministic conditionals and transparent truth, Adding a conditional to Kripke's theory of truth, Conditionals in theories of truth, HYPE: a system of hyperintensional logic (with an application to semantic paradoxes), NAIVE TRUTH AND RESTRICTED QUANTIFICATION: SAVING TRUTH A WHOLE LOT BETTER

Cites Work

• Curry's paradox and \(\omega \)-inconsistency
• Notes on naive semantics
• Bilattices and the theory of truth
• The simple consistency of a set theory based on the logic CSQ
• Outline of a Theory of Truth
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