Saving truth from paradox
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Publication:3058982
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- A non-probabilist principle of higher-order reasoning
- Assertion, denial, content, and (logical) form
- Epistemicism and the liar
- Sets and supersets
- The collapse of logical pluralism has been greatly exaggerated
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- A robust non-transitive logic
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- Paradox, repetition, revenge
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- THE POWER OF NAIVE TRUTH
- Is logic universal or hierarchical?
- Explicating the notion of truth within transparent intensional logic
- Introduction to author meets critics session on \textit{Saving truth from paradox}
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- Conjunctive paraconsistency
- Dissolving the paradoxicality paradox
- Self-referential propositions
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- Validity, the squeezing argument and alternative semantic systems: the case of Aristotelian syllogistic
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- A pragmatic dissolution of Curry's paradox
- Restriction by noncontraction
- Bicontextualism
- Mathematical perspectives on liar paradoxes
- NONCLASSICAL TRUTH WITH CLASSICAL STRENGTH. A PROOF-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF COMPOSITIONAL TRUTH OVER HYPE
- Sorites, curry and suitable models
- Circularity in soundness and completeness
- Minimalism, supervaluations and fixed points
- Principles for object-linguistic consequence: from logical to irreflexive
- Extendability and paradox
- Non-deterministic conditionals and transparent truth
- Rosy with sider? The case of the metaphysical liar
- Classical logic and the liar
- Foreword: three-valued logics and their applications
- Some Comments and Replies
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