Some Comments and Replies

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-25365-3_27zbMath1469.03022OpenAlexW2998713899MaRDI QIDQ3305682

Graham Priest

Publication date: 10 August 2020

Published in: Outstanding Contributions to Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-25365-3_27

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Paraconsistent logics (03B53)

Related Items

A Note on Gödel, Priest and Naïve Proof

Cites Work

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