The author shows that the sorites-type paradoxes can be subsumed under the inclosure schema, discussed, e.g., in his [Beyond the limits of thought. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press (1995; Zbl 0851.03001)], in a similar way as this is possible for the self-referential paradoxes of the liar type. Therefore these sorites-type paradoxes allow for a dialetheic solution, i.e.\ a solution in the context of paraconsistent logic. The basic ideas and the main technical details are clearly explained.
Recommendations
Cited in
(22)- On assertion and denial in the logic for pragmatics
- Denial and disagreement
- Verities, the sorites, and Theseus' ship
- Inclosure and intolerance
- DLEAC: a dialetheic logic with exclusive assumptions and conclusions
- The inclosure scheme and the solution to the paradoxes of self-reference
- Unity, identity, and topology: how to make donuts and cut things in half
- Dialetheic conditional modal logic
- At the limits of thought
- Some Comments and Replies
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 698629 (Why is no real title available?)
- Are the sorites and liar paradox of a kind?
- Vague inclosures
- Sorites, curry and suitable models
- Curry's paradox and the inclosure schema
- Introduction
- A site for Sorites
- Cut-offs and their neighbors
- Truth meets vagueness. Unifying the semantic and the soritical paradoxes
- Hegel’s Interpretation of the Sorites
- Dialetheism and distributed sorites
- Iterating both and neither: with applications to the paradoxes
This page was built for publication: Inclosures, vagueness, and self-reference
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q976536)
