scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4127169

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Publication:4206706





[For the entire collection see Zbl 0678.00003.] This paper outlines some of the philosophical issues relevant to paraconsistency. There are two arguments for acceptance of paraconsistent logic. First, that there are natural theories which are inconsistent but non-trivial. Examples are taken from law, science, mathematics, and philosophy (including 20th century philosophers influenced by modern logic). It is then argued that many of these theories are not trivial. Second, there are true contradictions, arising from multicriterial terms and from the logical and semantic paradoxes. Some consequences of paraconsistency are explored, in pragmatics (assertion, belief, and demands for consistency of metatheory), in metaphysics (Meinong's theory of objects, and some forms of dialectic, as understood by various thinkers from Fichte to Mao), and in philosophy of mathematics (Gödel's theorem, logicism, and the Hilbert program). Finally, there are hints of some consequences of paraconsistency elsewhere in philosophy.




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