Truth and meaning
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The general ideas of paradox and common sense, metalanguage issues, an apparent disadvantage and an apparent advantage of paraconsistent logics are commented upon. Different approaches to the problem of truth and meaning are considered in terms of a choice between the T-scheme and excluded middle on one hand, and excluded straddle on the other.
Recommendations
Cites work
- A model for belief revision
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3987249 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4010467 (Why is no real title available?)
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2048499 (Why is no real title available?)
- Languages with self-reference. I: Foundations (or: We can have everything in first-order logic!)
- Languages with self-reference. II: Knowledge, belief, and modality
- Outline of a Theory of Truth
- Some remarks on extending and interpreting theories with a partial predicate for truth
- The Logic of Contradiction
- Toward useful type-free theories. I
Cited in
(8)- Truth and reflection
- Resolving contradictions: A plausible semantics for inconsistent systems
- Saving truth from paradox
- On the metatheory for paraconsistent truth
- True, false, paranormal and ‘designated’?: a reply to Jenkins
- The Trivial Object and the Non-Uiviality of a Semantically Closed Theory with Descriptions
- Meaning, Truth, and Physics
- Metatheory and dialetheism
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