scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3987249
[For the entire collection see Zbl 0563.00002.] This discussion applies the methods of Kripke and Feferman for an axiomatic definition of a (partial) truth predicate within arithmetic to the notion of meaningful applicability or significance where one would say that a property expressed by a predicate, \(\theta\), is meaningfully applied to x just in case \(\theta(\bar x)\) is either true or false (when \(\bar x\) denotes x). Similarly, a sentence is significant if it has a truth value, i.e. is either true or false. Here it is shown that a predicate, S, for significance may be consistently defined within an axiomatic system with primitive predicates, T, for truth, and F, for falsity. Equivalently, it is shown, T and S may be taken as primitives and F defined in terms of them.
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- AXIOMS FOR DETERMINATENESS AND TRUTH
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 896242 (Why is no real title available?)
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