Logics of truth

The author presupposes familiarity with efforts, since Kripke in 1975, to develop languages in which, by transfinite constructions, a truth predicate T() can be defined. Once the truth predicate is attained one can investigate the logic for T(). In particular, one can look for similarities and differences between the logics for T() and logics for the necessity operator N(). Such a comparison is the focus of this paper. However, there have been three lines of effort to define a T() \underbar{via} such hierarchies: Aczel-Scott, Kripke-Feferman-Gilmore, Gupta-Herzberger. The author clearly, but efficiently, sketches how these lines require different axioms for their T() while not completely specifying all of the axioms. So, there are the problems of finding the right, or best, modal logics for these various T() predicates. The author finds a system ST (stable truth) for Gupta-Herzberger most interesting; but it, amongst other things, lacks an analog of necessitation. So, a value of this paper is its motivation to seek adequate axiomatizations of truth predicates hierarchically constructed.

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