Reasoning about truth
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The Perlis construction is described and it is argued that it has certain inadequacies. Therefore another approach to the problem of reasoning about truth is offered, and it is explained why this approach is more preferable. The approach draws on fairly recent work in paraconsistent logic.
Recommendations
Cites work
- Accepting inconsistencies from the paradoxes
- Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4130375 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3648682 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3989325 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1028818 (Why is no real title available?)
- Introduction: Paraconsistent logics
- Languages with self-reference. I: Foundations (or: We can have everything in first-order logic!)
- Languages with self-reference. II: Knowledge, belief, and modality
- Semantic closure
- Sense, entailment and modus ponens
- The logic of paradox
Cited in
(23)- The value of the four values
- Interpreting disjunctive logic programs based on a strong sense of disjunction
- Resolving contradictions: A plausible semantics for inconsistent systems
- Four-valued paradefinite logics
- A dissimilarity-based framework for generating inconsistency-tolerant logics
- Distance-based paraconsistent logics
- A review of the relations between logical argumentation and reasoning with maximal consistency
- Analysing inconsistent first-order knowledgebases
- Truth and Probability
- Recovering Consistency by Forgetting Inconsistency
- Reasoning with different levels of uncertainty
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 18853 (Why is no real title available?)
- Nonmonotonic reasoning based on incomplete logic
- Paraconsistent constructive logic with strong negation as a contraction-free relevant logic
- Finding explanations of inconsistency in multi-context systems
- An approach to human-level commonsense reasoning
- Truth and knowledge
- Three-valued paraconsistent propositional logics
- Handling inconsistency in knowledge systems
- A postulate-driven study of logical argumentation
- Maximal and premaximal paraconsistency in the framework of three-valued semantics
- Ideal paraconsistent logics
- A logic for reasoning with inconsistency
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