Indicative conditionals, restricted quantification, and naive truth
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2804479
DOI10.1017/S1755020315000301zbMATH Open1381.03007MaRDI QIDQ2804479FDOQ2804479
Authors: Hartry Field 
Publication date: 29 April 2016
Published in: The Review of Symbolic Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)
Cites Work
- Counterfactuals.
- Saving truth from paradox
- Outline of a Theory of Truth
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Naive truth and restricted quantification: saving truth a whole lot better
- Relevant restricted quantification
- Quick completeness proofs for some logics of conditionals
Cited In (17)
- Paraconsistent or paracomplete?
- De Finettian logics of indicative conditionals. I: Trivalent semantics and validity
- THE POWER OF NAIVE TRUTH
- Embedding \textit{if and only if}
- Anti-exceptionalism, truth and the BA-plan
- Non-deterministic conditionals and transparent truth
- Guest editors' introduction
- Some Comments and Replies
- Conditionals in theories of truth
- A revenge-immune solution to the semantic paradoxes
- Toward a Restriction-Centered Theory of Truth and Meaning (RCT)
- Naive truth and restricted quantification: saving truth a whole lot better
- AN EXPRESSIVIST ANALYSIS OF THE INDICATIVE CONDITIONAL WITH A RESTRICTOR SEMANTICS
- Adding a conditional to Kripke's theory of truth
- A new conditional for naive truth theory
- Truth without standard models: some conceptual problems reloaded
- Triviality for restrictor conditionals
This page was built for publication: Indicative conditionals, restricted quantification, and naive truth
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2804479)
