Revision without revision sequences: self-referential truth
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Publication:2000672
DOI10.1007/s10992-018-9474-1zbMath1457.03020OpenAlexW2886265244MaRDI QIDQ2000672
Publication date: 28 June 2019
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-018-9474-1
Related Items (2)
Designing paradoxes: a revision-theoretic approach ⋮ Revision without revision sequences: circular definitions
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