Reflecting on incompleteness

DOI10.2307/2274902zbMath0746.03046OpenAlexW2114374802MaRDI QIDQ3981446

Publication date: 26 June 1992

Published in: Journal of Symbolic Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2274902

zbMATH Keywords

incompleteness reflection principles predicativity predicative analysis reflective closure of a schematic theory schematic Peano arithmetic schematic set theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

First-order arithmetic and fragments (03F30) Axiomatics of classical set theory and its fragments (03E30)

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