Comparing fixed-point and revision theories of truth
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Publication:839652
DOI10.1007/S10992-009-9107-9zbMATH Open1182.03017OpenAlexW2122067050MaRDI QIDQ839652FDOQ839652
Publication date: 2 September 2009
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-009-9107-9
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Cites Work
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- Outline of a Theory of Truth
- Four valued semantics and the Liar
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- Paradox, truth and logic. I. Paradox and truth
- How truth behaves when there's no vicious reference
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- An alternate formulation of Kripke's theory of truth
Cited In (18)
- FORMAL REPRESENTATIONS OF DEPENDENCE AND GROUNDEDNESS
- Revision without revision sequences: self-referential truth
- Comparing more revision and fixed-point theories of truth
- A guide to truth predicates in the modern era
- Revision without revision sequences: circular definitions
- Guest editors' introduction
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A fixed point theory over stratified truth
- Truth meets vagueness. Unifying the semantic and the soritical paradoxes
- Limits in the revision theory. More than just definite verdicts
- On Gupta-Belnap revision theories of truth, Kripkean fixed points and the next stable set
- Alternative ways for truth to behave when there's no vicious reference
- Alternative revision theories of truth
- Editorial introduction
- A UNIFIED THEORY OF TRUTH AND PARADOX
- The truth is never simple
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- How truth behaves when there's no vicious reference
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