Fitch's paradox and probabilistic antirealism

DOI10.1007/s11225-007-9058-5zbMath1130.03005OpenAlexW2001778372MaRDI QIDQ2454642

Igor Douven

Publication date: 16 October 2007

Published in: Studia Logica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9058-5

zbMATH Keywords

truthepistemic logicBayesian epistemologyFitch's paradoxantirealismknowability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items (2)

On Bradley's preservation condition for conditionals ⋮ Reasoning about evidence

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