Meaning and proofs: on the conflict between classical and intuitionistic logic

Cited In (35)

Dummett's case for intuitionism
Antirealism, meaning and truth-conditional semantics
From the knowability paradox to the existence of proofs
Logical consequence and the paradoxes
Why conclusions should remain single
Denotational semantics for languages of epistemic grounding based on Prawitz's theory of grounds
Towards a semantics based on the notion of justification
Proofs, grounds and empty functions: epistemic compulsion in Prawitz's semantics
Classical harmony: Rules of inference and the meaning of the logical constants
Harmony and autonomy in classical logic
On reduction rules, meaning-as-use, and proof-theoretic semantics
Calculi of epistemic grounding based on Prawitz's theory of grounds
On the equivalence conjecture for proof-theoretic harmony
Pragmatic and dialogic interpretations of bi-intuitionism. I
Fitch's paradox and probabilistic antirealism
Program testing and the meaning explanations of intuitionistic type theory
Classical harmony and separability
Rethinking logical disagreements: a critique of verbalism and a normative constraints approach
Proofs, reasoning and the metamorphosis of logic
Introduction: Inferences and proofs
Grounding operators: transitivity and trees, logicality and balance
An interpretation of classical proofs
Of marriage and mathematics: inferentialism and social ontology
A notion of \(C\)-justification for empirical statements
Verificationism and Classical Realizability
The completeness of intuitionistic logic with respect to a validity concept based on an inversion principle
Intuitionistic truth
Parts, classes and parts of classes: an anti-realist reading of Lewisian mereology
Manifestability and epistemic truth
Game of grounds
What is a relevant connective?
Game semantics and the manifestation thesis
Dag Prawitz on proofs, operations and grounding
Five observations concerning the intended meaning of the intuitionistic logical constants
The original sin of proof-theoretic semantics

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