scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1281125
One common sense platitude about truth regards truth as a basically wild thing which can never be confined within human knowledge. Such a common sense realism about truth is expressible as: The truths are what they are independently of whether or not human beings ever do or can know them. Neil Tennant ``tames the True by showing that nothing worth wanting as true in mathematics or natural science ranges beyond the limits of human knowledge. Any thing worthy of the name true in mathematics or natural science is in principle knowable. Tennant's position is called semantic anti-realism because it denies that truths ``are really there independently of human knowledge. However, terms such as `anti-realism' and `irrealism' can evoke suspicion of anti-rational, ill-argued positions parading under the banner of postmodernism. So it is best to avoid such terms in a short synoptic review. Indeed Chapters 2 and 3 of Tennant's book make a significant contribution with their careful analyses of philosophical terms such as `realism', `anti-realism', and `irrealism'. Those who follow discussions about realism in mathematics initiated by Michael Dummett and extended by Crispin Wright will profit from these two chapters. Those who work in these areas need to study all of Tennant's book for it moves the arguments and issues significantly forward. The book offers a comprehensive philosophy of mathematics and natural science whose orientation the author expresses with ``Logical empiricism was almost right! Note a few of the important moves in the construction of a viable logical empiricism for the 21st century. Against Quine, Kripke et al. he argues that meanings are determinate and that peoples' grasp of meaning is manifested by being able to specify what it is like to be in a position to assert a claim. With meaning so interpreted bivalence must be abandoned. Without bivalence he needs to abandon classical logic and so we find a case for a relevant intuitionistic logic as the correct logic for mathematics and natural science. He can reconstruct an analytic/synthetic distinction and effectively set aside A. Church's old argument that all verification criteria of cognitive meaningfulness will be too broad. Many more important theses are analyzed and evaluated. It is a demanding book which can be understood only by those with knowledge and appreciation of mathematics. The author draws on sophisticated mathematics for many of his examples. Fortunately, the introductory chapter guides readers through the details with a chapter by chapter synopsis and statement of author's stand on crucial issues. Working through Tennant's book in a reading group or advanced course on the philosophy of mathematics or natural science would be the way to gain most from it.
- Realism and understanding
- Tame almost primitive elements
- The indefinability of ``one
- Paradox and logical revision. A short introduction
- Anything goes
- Lost in translation: unknowable propositions in probabilistic frameworks
- On a new tentative solution to Fitch's paradox
- Diamonds are a philosopher's best friends. The knowability paradox and modal epistemic relevance logic
- On the equivalence conjecture for proof-theoretic harmony
- Classical harmony and separability
- Harmony in multiple-conclusion natural-deduction
- Speech acts, categoricity, and the meanings of logical connectives
- Knowability and other onto-theological paradoxes
- Manifestability and epistemic truth
- What is the logic of inference?
- Parts, classes and parts of classes: an anti-realist reading of Lewisian mereology
- Some remarks on restricting the knowability principle
- The Church-Fitch knowability paradox in the light of structural proof theory
- A Church-Fitch proof for the universality of causation
- Discovering knowability: a semantic analysis
- Fitch's paradox and probabilistic antirealism
- Distributed knowability and Fitch's paradox
- New foundations for a relational theory of theory-revision
- Counterfactual knowability revisited
- How to solve the knowability paradox with transcendental epistemology
- Informal proof, formal proof, formalism
- Which Logic for the Radical Anti-realist?
- Stable philosophical systems and radical anti-realism
- Cut for core logic
- Bilateral relevant logic
- Harmonious rules for identity
- Proof theory in philosophy of mathematics
- Knowability and a new paradox of happiness
- Nonmonotonicity and knowability: as knowable as possible
- Semantic pollution and syntactic purity
- Subformula and separation properties in natural deduction via small Kripke models
- `Knowable' as `known after an announcement'
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1202559 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incompleteness, Mechanism, and Optimism
- Strict finitism and the happy sorites
- The anatomy of innocence
- Defending the possibility of knowledge
- A logic inspired by natural language: quantifiers as subnectors
- Knowability as potential knowledge
- Incarnating Kripke's skepticism about meaning
- Structures and logics: a case for (a) relativism
- Pluralism and ``bad mathematical theories: challenging our prejudices
- Zeno's arrow and the infinitesimal calculus
- The real Chevalley involution
- Why conclusions should remain single
- Neo-Fregeanism: an embarrassment of riches
- Weak disharmony: some lessons for proof-theoretic semantics
- INTUITIONISTIC EPISTEMIC LOGIC
- Proof-theoretic pluralism
- Core Gödel
- Quantum epistemology and constructivism
- Wright's strict finitistic logic in the classical metatheory: the propositional case
- From the knowability paradox to the existence of proofs
- Which `intensional paradoxes' are paradoxes?
- Corcoran the mathematician
- Categoricity problem for LP and K3
- Knowing possibilities and the possibility of knowing: a further challenge for the anti-realist
- On the non-substantiality of logic: a case study
- Inferentialism and uniformity
- Wright's first-order logic of strict finitism
- Fitch's paradox beyond verificationism: on a puzzle for closure and some modally qualified principles
- Coarsening natural deduction proofs. I: Finding perfect proofs
- Intuitionistic epistemic logic, Kripke models and Fitch's paradox
- A hierarchy of relevance properties
- From explosion to implosion: a new justification for the ex falso quodlibet rule
- Counterfactual knowledge, factivity, and the overgeneration of knowledge
- The dynamic approach to knowability
- A logical challenge to correlationism: the Church-Fitch paradox in Husserl's account of fulfilment, truth, and meaning
- Carnap's (categoricity) problem
- A memoir
- Indeterminacy and non-classical logic
- The objectivity of mathematics
- Williamson's woes
- Knowability and the capacity to know
- Fitch's paradox and ceteris paribus modalities
- The incarnation and the knowability paradox
- Introduction to knowability and beyond
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