Some remarks on restricting the knowability principle
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Publication:2442887
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1281125 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5263144 (Why is no real title available?)
- A logical analysis of some value concepts
- A paradox regained
- A principled solution to Fitch's paradox
- Clues to the paradoxes of knowability: reply to Dummett and Tennant
- Fitch's argument and typing knowledge
- Modal logic
- On a side effect of solving Fitch's paradox by typing knowledge
- The knower paradox in the light of provability interpretations of modal logic
- Victor vanquished
- Victor's error
- What one may come to know
Cited in
(10)- Counterfactual knowability revisited
- Williamson's woes
- Moore's paradox as an argument against anti-realism
- Truth, demonstration and knowledge: a classical solution to the paradox of knowability
- ‘P is true and non-Cartesian’ is non-Cartesian
- A principled solution to Fitch's paradox
- Knowing possibilities and the possibility of knowing: a further challenge for the anti-realist
- The knowability paradox and truths dependent on their epistemic status
- Lost in translation: unknowable propositions in probabilistic frameworks
- Fitch back in action again?
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