Some remarks on restricting the knowability principle
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2442887
DOI10.1007/S11229-010-9833-0zbMATH Open1284.03051OpenAlexW2025179691MaRDI QIDQ2442887FDOQ2442887
Authors: Martin J. Fischer 
Publication date: 1 April 2014
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9833-0
Recommendations
Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)
Cites Work
- Modal logic
- A paradox regained
- A logical analysis of some value concepts
- Clues to the paradoxes of knowability: reply to Dummett and Tennant
- What one may come to know
- On a side effect of solving Fitch's paradox by typing knowledge
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Victor's error
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Victor vanquished
- The knower paradox in the light of provability interpretations of modal logic
- Fitch's argument and typing knowledge
- A principled solution to Fitch's paradox
Cited In (10)
- Williamson's woes
- Moore's paradox as an argument against anti-realism
- Truth, demonstration and knowledge: a classical solution to the paradox of knowability
- ‘P is true and non-Cartesian’ is non-Cartesian
- A principled solution to Fitch's paradox
- Knowing possibilities and the possibility of knowing: a further challenge for the anti-realist
- The knowability paradox and truths dependent on their epistemic status
- Fitch back in action again?
- Lost in translation: unknowable propositions in probabilistic frameworks
- Counterfactual knowability revisited
This page was built for publication: Some remarks on restricting the knowability principle
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2442887)
