What one may come to know
This is a paper about the Knowability Paradox (alias Fitch Paradox) and verificationism. The author suggests giving the verificationist thesis ``Every true proposition is possibly known a more dynamic reading: ``Every true proposition may come to be known. This shift in perspective suggests formalizing the verificationist thesis as a learnability thesis expressed in a dynamic epistemic modal logic \(B \rightarrow \exists A \langle A!\rangle KB\) (``If \(B\) is true, then there exists a formula \(A\) such that after some true public announcement of \(A\), it is known that \(B\)). While this proposal does not solve (or avoid) the Knowability Paradox, it opens an interesting new line of research. The author points out various forms of learnability and, among other things, suggests considering the following strengthened form of the verificationist thesis: ``Every true proposition may come to be common knowledge. The present reviewer has one critical comment. The author describes avoiding the Knowability Paradox by using a non-modal base logic weaker than classical logic with the following metaphor: ``This is like turning down the volume on your radio so as not to hear the bad news. You will not hear much good news either. One may object that this metaphor misses the point. The bad news is avoided, not its `hearability'.
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- To be announced
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- Verificationists versus realists: The battle over knowability
- Group announcement logic
- Fitch's paradox and ceteris paribus modalities
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