Distributed knowability and Fitch's paradox

DOI10.1007/s11225-007-9070-9zbMath1132.03004MaRDI QIDQ2464652

Rafał Palczewski

Publication date: 17 December 2007

Published in: Studia Logica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9070-9

zbMATH Keywords

anti-realism; Fitch's paradox; knowability; group knowledge; modal epistemic logic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

03A05: Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations

03B42: Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change)

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The many faces of closure and introspection. An ineractive perspective

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