Two incomplete anti-realist modal epistemic logics
DOI10.2307/2274969zbMATH Open0706.03019OpenAlexW2061038188MaRDI QIDQ3486546FDOQ3486546
Authors: Timothy Williamson
Publication date: 1990
Published in: Journal of Symbolic Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2274969
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truthepistemic logicpossible worlds semanticsfinite model propertyanti-realismnon-trivial anti-realist systems of classical modal logic
Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45)
Cites Work
Cited In (7)
- From the knowability paradox to the existence of proofs
- Modal logic for other-world agnostics: Neutrality and Halldén incompleteness
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- How basic is the Basic Revisionary Argument?
- Distributed knowability and Fitch's paradox
- Diamonds are a philosopher's best friends. The knowability paradox and modal epistemic relevance logic
- Inverse images of box formulas in modal logic
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