The many faces of closure and introspection. An ineractive perspective
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Publication:1947027
DOI10.1007/s10992-011-9214-2zbMath1260.03005MaRDI QIDQ1947027
Publication date: 11 April 2013
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9214-2
introspection; common knowledge; epistemic logic; closure; distributed knowledge; knowability; deductive omniscience
03A05: Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations
03B42: Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change)
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