Dynamics we can believe in: a view from the Amsterdam school on the centenary of Evert Willem Beth
DOI10.1007/S11229-010-9779-2zbMATH Open1226.03031OpenAlexW2167685886MaRDI QIDQ542124FDOQ542124
Authors: Cédric Dégremont, Jonathan Alexander Zvesper
Publication date: 8 June 2011
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9779-2
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Cited In (4)
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