Dynamic interactive epistemology
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1886744
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.10.006zbMath1068.91071OpenAlexW2004865763MaRDI QIDQ1886744
Publication date: 19 November 2004
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:e2b1455a-d58d-4714-a1ad-3064f37a5e0a
Related Items
Rational choice and AGM belief revision ⋮ Private Expansion and Revision in Multi-agent Settings ⋮ A Standard Internal Calculus for Lewis’ Counterfactual Logics ⋮ Nested Sequent Calculi for Conditional Logics ⋮ CONDITIONAL BELIEFS: FROM NEIGHBOURHOOD SEMANTICS TO SEQUENT CALCULUS ⋮ The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology ⋮ My beliefs about your beliefs: a case study in theory of mind and epistemic logic ⋮ A discrete duality between nonmonotonic consequence relations and convex geometries ⋮ Evidence and plausibility in neighborhood structures ⋮ IS CAUSAL REASONING HARDER THAN PROBABILISTIC REASONING? ⋮ Tracking probabilistic truths: a logic for statistical learning ⋮ Belief change in branching time: AGM-consistency and iterated revision ⋮ A Qualitative Theory of Dynamic Interactive Belief Revision ⋮ Bisimulation for conditional modalities ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Assertion, belief, and context ⋮ Common knowledge of payoff uncertainty in games ⋮ Multiagent belief revision ⋮ Intricate axioms as interaction axioms ⋮ Temporal interaction of information and belief ⋮ Agreement theorems in dynamic-epistemic logic ⋮ Keep changing your beliefs, aiming for the truth ⋮ Interrogative belief revision based on epistemic strategies ⋮ Dynamic epistemic logic for implicit and explicit beliefs ⋮ Dynamics we can believe in: a view from the Amsterdam school on the centenary of Evert Willem Beth ⋮ Revocable belief revision ⋮ Dynamic preference logic meets iterated belief change: representation results and postulates characterization ⋮ Conditional Probability Logic over Conditional Probability Spaces ⋮ Simple hyperintensional belief revision ⋮ Meet meets join: the interaction between pooled and common knowledge ⋮ Learning by Questions and Answers: From Belief-Revision Cycles to Doxastic Fixed Points ⋮ Probabilistic dynamic belief revision ⋮ A Dynamic Analysis of Interactive Rationality ⋮ Logic of convex order ⋮ On Revocable and Irrevocable Belief Revision ⋮ Axiomatic characterization of the AGM theory of belief revision in a temporal logic ⋮ Standard Sequent Calculi for Lewis’ Logics of Counterfactuals ⋮ Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox ⋮ Indicative conditionals and graded information ⋮ Logic and Game Theory ⋮ Toward a theory of play: a logical perspective on games and interaction ⋮ DYNAMIC HYPERINTENSIONAL BELIEF REVISION ⋮ A simple modal logic for belief revision ⋮ Prolegomena to dynamic logic for belief revision
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Quick completeness proofs for some logics of conditionals
- An impossibility theorem on beliefs in games
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Two modellings for theory change
- Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
- We can't disagree forever
- Psychological games and sequential rationality
- Agreeing to disagree
- Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
- On the interpretation of decision problems with imperfect recall
- Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees
- Knowledge spaces with arbitrarily high rank
- Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
- Interactive epistemology. I: Knowledge
- The hierarchical approach to modeling knowledge and common knowledge
- Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria
- Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
- Memory and perfect recall in extensive games
- Set-theoretic completeness for epistemic and conditional logic
- Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information
- Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions
- Strategic Information Transmission
- A quantitative analysis of modal logic
- Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
- Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I Normal Modal Propositional Calculi
