Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information

DOI10.1006/jeth.1993.1017zbMath0802.90126MaRDI QIDQ2366833

Philip J. Reny

Publication date: 19 August 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4386.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

perfect information; Bayesian rational

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

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