Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information
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Publication:2366833
DOI10.1006/jeth.1993.1017zbMath0802.90126OpenAlexW1979260900MaRDI QIDQ2366833
Publication date: 19 August 1993
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/archive/refs4386.pdf
Related Items (24)
AGENT CONNECTEDNESS AND BACKWARD INDUCTION ⋮ Dynamic interactive epistemology ⋮ An epistemic characterization of MACA ⋮ Analogy-based expectation equilibrium ⋮ Common belief of rationality in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma ⋮ Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games ⋮ A non-equilibrium analysis of the finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma ⋮ On rationalizability in extensive games ⋮ Independence on relative probability spaces and consistent assessments in game trees ⋮ Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs ⋮ Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games ⋮ Non-equilibrium play in centipede games ⋮ Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox ⋮ Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium ⋮ Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction ⋮ Cycles of learning in the centipede game ⋮ King of the Hill: giving backward induction its best shot ⋮ Common belief in future and restricted past rationality ⋮ Dynamic preference logic meets iterated belief change: representation results and postulates characterization ⋮ Conditional dominance, rationalizability, and game forms ⋮ The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction ⋮ An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games ⋮ Logic and Game Theory ⋮ On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
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