Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games
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Publication:857564
DOI10.1007/S00182-006-0031-8zbMATH Open1154.91313OpenAlexW2114992488MaRDI QIDQ857564FDOQ857564
Authors: N. E. Zubov 
Publication date: 19 December 2006
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0031-8
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Cites Work
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- Proper rationalizability and backward induction
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- Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games
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Cited In (11)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On Tolerance Analysis of Games with Belief Revision
- Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games
- Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games
- A rational way of playing: revision theory for strategic interaction
- Optimal decision rules in repeated games where players infer an opponent's mind via simplified belief calculation
- Strategy constrained by cognitive limits, and the rationality of belief-revision policies
- Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games
- Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs
- Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction
- An algorithm for proper rationalizability
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