Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games
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Publication:857564
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Cites work
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Cited in
(18)- Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games
- Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games
- Rationalizability and epistemic priority orderings
- On Tolerance Analysis of Games with Belief Revision
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 177098 (Why is no real title available?)
- Common belief in future and restricted past rationality
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- Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games
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- Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games
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