Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.008zbMath1281.91030OpenAlexW2025742229MaRDI QIDQ2455676

Andrés Perea

Publication date: 26 October 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.06.008

zbMATH Keywords

belief revisionrationalityextensive-form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (2)

Minimal belief revision leads to backward induction ⋮ Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games

Cites Work

• Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games
• On rationalizability in extensive games
• Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs
• Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• Proper rationalizability and backward induction
• Proper belief revision and equilibrium in dynamic games
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
• Sequential Equilibria
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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