Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs

DOI10.1007/s001820200090zbMath1083.91006OpenAlexW1967275092MaRDI QIDQ1414419

Geir B. Asheim

Publication date: 23 November 2003

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200090

zbMATH Keywords

backward inductionRationalizabilitystrategic form

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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