Proper rationalizability in lexicographic beliefs

DOI10.1007/s001820200090zbMath1083.91006MaRDI QIDQ1414419

Geir B. Asheim

Publication date: 23 November 2003

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200090

zbMATH Keywords

backward induction; Rationalizability; strategic form

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory

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