On the epistemic foundation for iterated weak dominance: an analysis in a logic of individual and collective attitudes
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Publication:2441476
DOI10.1007/s10992-013-9297-zzbMath1286.03047OpenAlexW2042065436MaRDI QIDQ2441476
Publication date: 24 March 2014
Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-013-9297-z
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A minimal logic for interactive epistemology ⋮ Epistemic logic meets epistemic game theory: a comparison between multi-agent Kripke models and type spaces
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