On the epistemic foundation for iterated weak dominance: an analysis in a logic of individual and collective attitudes
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Publication:2441476
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Cited in
(5)- The logic of dominance reasoning
- A unified epistemic analysis of iterated elimination algorithms from regret viewpoint
- Characterizations of iterated admissibility based on PEGL
- A minimal logic for interactive epistemology
- Epistemic logic meets epistemic game theory: a comparison between multi-agent Kripke models and type spaces
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