A modal logic of epistemic games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2344955
DOI10.3390/g1040478zbMath1311.91047MaRDI QIDQ2344955
Emiliano Lorini, François Schwarzentruber
Publication date: 19 May 2015
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g1040478
91A10: Noncooperative games
03B42: Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change)
91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory
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