A modal logic of epistemic games
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Publication:2344955
DOI10.3390/g1040478zbMath1311.91047OpenAlexW2092030382MaRDI QIDQ2344955
Emiliano Lorini, François Schwarzentruber
Publication date: 19 May 2015
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g1040478
Noncooperative games (91A10) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)
Related Items (7)
On the use (and abuse) of logic in game theory ⋮ From self-regarding to other-regarding agents in strategic games: a logical analysis ⋮ A STIT logic for reasoning about social influence ⋮ On the epistemic foundation for iterated weak dominance: an analysis in a logic of individual and collective attitudes ⋮ Epistemic GDL: a logic for representing and reasoning about imperfect information games ⋮ Epistemic logic meets epistemic game theory: a comparison between multi-agent Kripke models and type spaces ⋮ An Epistemic Logic of Extensive Games
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