The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3668373 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3274494 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3195782 (Why is no real title available?)
- Agreeing to disagree
- Axiomatic Characterizations of Rational Choice in Strategic Environments
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- On solutions of Bayesian games
- Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
- Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
- Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Preference-based belief operators
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7450029 (Why is no real title available?)
- Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
- From classical to epistemic game theory
- Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
- An epistemic characterization of MACA
- Rationalizability and Nash equilibria in guessing games
- Subjective games and equilibria
- A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies
- Identification of complete information games
- Strategic risk and coordination failure in blame games
- Bayesian coalitional rationalizability
- On \(p\)-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality
- Backward induction and beliefs about oneself
- Iterative information update and stability of strategies
- Lexicographic rationalizability and iterated admissibility
- Theories of coalitional rationality
- Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
- Hierarchies of beliefs for compact possibility models
- Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies
- Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
- Admissibility and assumption
- Epistemic conditions for rationalizability
- Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
- Aspiration-based reinforcement learning in repeated interaction games: An overview
- Dynamics we can believe in: a view from the Amsterdam school on the centenary of Evert Willem Beth
- ``Cautious utility maximation and iterated weak dominance
- Common belief of rationality in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
- Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies
- Uniqueness conditions for strongly point-rationalizable solutions to games with metrizable strategy sets
- On the epistemic foundation for iterated weak dominance: an analysis in a logic of individual and collective attitudes
- Interactive epistemology and solution concepts for games with asymmetric information
- Dominated strategies and common knowledge
- Expectational coordination in simple economic contexts. Concepts and analysis with emphasis on strategic substituabilities
- Rationalizability in continuous games
- Intrinsic correlation in games
- Epistemic characterizations of iterated deletion of inferior strategy profiles in preference-based type spaces
- Mechanism design with model specification
- Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information
- A modal logic of epistemic games
- Hierarchies of compact beliefs and rationalizable behavior
- Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
- Admissibility and common belief.
- Bayesian games with intentions
- Maximin play in completely mixed strategic games
- Aggregation in a model of price competition
- Rationalizability in games with a continuum of players
- An algorithm for proper rationalizability
- Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria
- On the evaluation of solution concepts
- A note on Bayesian games
- Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
- Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty
- Belief in the opponents' future rationality
- Game theory, maximum entropy, minimum discrepancy and robust Bayesian decision theory
- A minimal logic for interactive epistemology
- Correlated-belief equilibrium
- Iterated regret minimization: a new solution concept
- Iterated strict dominance in general games
- Bounds for best response functions in binary games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 733409 (Why is no real title available?)
- Rational beliefs in rationalizability
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- Common knowledge of rationality and market clearing in economies with asymmetric information
- An indistinguishability result on rationalizability under general preferences
- Universally rational belief hierarchies
- Final decisions, the Nash equilibrium and solvability in games with common knowledge of logical abilities
- Tremples in the Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
- The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
- Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality
- Preference, rationalizability and equilibrium
- Bounded rationality and correlated equilibria
- Pairwise epistemic conditions for correlated rationalizability
- Utility proportional beliefs
- Rational belief hierarchies
- Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory
- Agent connectedness and backward induction
- Are the antiglobalists right? Gains-from-trade without a Walrasian auctioneer
- Mixed strategies and preference for randomization in games with ambiguity averse agents
- On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets
- Iterated dominance revisited
- On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
- Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games
- Strategic games with security and potential level players
- An epistemic model of an agent who does not reflect on reasoning processes
- Strategies as states
- Uncertain information structures and backward induction
- The epistemic structure of a theory of a game
- Strategic cautiousness as an expression of robustness to ambiguity
- Forward induction reasoning and correct beliefs
- On common belief in future rationality in games with ambiguous orderings of information sets
- Responsive and strong responsive evolutionary dynamics
- An epistemic approach to stochastic games
- Rationalizability in general situations
- Incomplete preferences or incomplete information? On rationalizability in games with private values
- Risk-neutral equilibria of noncooperative games
- Periodic strategies. II: Generalizations and extensions
- Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning
- Rationalizable expectations and sunspot equilibria in an overlapping-generations economy
This page was built for publication: The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1108208)
