FROM CLASSICAL TO EPISTEMIC GAME THEORY
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Publication:5406291
DOI10.1142/S0219198914400015zbMath1294.91029MaRDI QIDQ5406291
Publication date: 1 April 2014
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Utility theory for games (91A30)
Related Items (7)
Computation as social agency: what, how and who ⋮ Satisfiability in a Temporal Multi-valueted Logic Based on Z ⋮ Characterizing solution concepts in terms of common knowledge of rationality ⋮ Rationalizable strategies in games with incomplete preferences ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Pairwise epistemic conditions for correlated rationalizability ⋮ Rationalizability in large games
Cites Work
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- Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
- Semantical Analysis of Modal Logic I Normal Modal Propositional Calculi
- Equilibrium points in n -person games
- Commentary on the Three Notes of Emile Borel
- Zermelo and the early history of game theory
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