Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
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Publication:1079452
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90035-3zbMath0597.90003OpenAlexW2134190500MaRDI QIDQ1079452
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90035-3
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