The incoherence of agreeing to disagree

DOI10.1007/BF01082053zbMath0856.90005OpenAlexW2081840512MaRDI QIDQ1923815

Robert F. Nau

Publication date: 13 October 1996

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01082053

zbMATH Keywords

arbitrageBayesian rationalityagreeing-to-disagree theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Related Items (2)

Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors ⋮ The aggregation of imprecise probabilities

Cites Work

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• Arbitrage, rationality, and equilibrium
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• Information, trade and common knowledge
• We can't disagree forever
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Agreeing to disagree
• Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree
• Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
• The Prevision of a Prevision
• Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge
• Joint Coherence in Games of Incomplete Information
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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