Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information

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Publication:3701164

DOI10.2307/1914160zbMath0578.90019OpenAlexW2085375677MaRDI QIDQ3701164

Talbot Page, Richard D. McKelvey

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1914160




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