Common knowledge equilibrium of Boolean securities in distributed information market
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Publication:2656740
DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2020.125540zbMATH Open1497.91125arXiv2002.09086OpenAlexW3045443875MaRDI QIDQ2656740FDOQ2656740
Authors: Masahiko Ueda
Publication date: 16 March 2021
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We investigate common knowledge equilibrium of separable (or parity) and totally symmetric Boolean securities in distributed information market. We theoretically show that clearing price converges to the true value when a common prior probability distribution of information of each player satisfies some conditions.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.09086
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