Common knowledge equilibrium of Boolean securities in distributed information market
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Publication:2656740
DOI10.1016/j.amc.2020.125540zbMath1497.91125arXiv2002.09086OpenAlexW3045443875MaRDI QIDQ2656740
Publication date: 16 March 2021
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.09086
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