Common knowledge equilibrium of Boolean securities in distributed information market

DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2020.125540MaRDI QIDQ2656740zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Masahiko Ueda

Publication date 16 March 2021

Published in Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.09086

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledge equilibriumdistributed information market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44)

Abstract: We investigate common knowledge equilibrium of separable (or parity) and totally symmetric Boolean securities in distributed information market. We theoretically show that clearing price converges to the true value when a common prior probability distribution of information of each player satisfies some conditions.

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Cites work

• A course in game theory.
• Agreeing to disagree
• An in-depth analysis of information markets with aggregate uncertainty
• Common Knowledge of an Aggregate of Expectations
• Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information
• Computation in a distributed information market
• Game theory
• Gaming prediction markets: equilibrium strategies with a market maker
• Various error settings bring different noise-driven effects on network reciprocity in spatial prisoner's dilemma
• We can't disagree forever

Cited in

(1)

• Computation in a distributed information market

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