Common knowledge equilibrium of Boolean securities in distributed information market

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2020.125540zbMath1497.91125arXiv2002.09086OpenAlexW3045443875MaRDI QIDQ2656740

Masahiko Ueda

Publication date: 16 March 2021

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2002.09086

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledge equilibriumdistributed information market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

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• Computation in a distributed information market
• Common Knowledge of an Aggregate of Expectations
• Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information

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