Game theory without partitions, and applications to speculation and consensus

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2019-0010MaRDI QIDQ2099073zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors John D. Geanakoplos

Publication date 22 November 2022

Published in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0010

zbMATH Keywords

agreementcommon knowledgespeculationbetting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Recommendations

• Speculation under unawareness
• Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
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• A nonspeculation theorem with an application to committee design

Cites work

• A note on 'fulfilled expectations' equilibria
• Agreeing to disagree
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Common Knowledge of an Aggregate of Expectations
• Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information
• Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
• Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
• Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• Learning to agree
• On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations
• Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
• The revelation of information in strategic market games. A critique of rational expectations equilibrium
• We can't disagree forever

Cited in

(17)

• A nonspeculation theorem with an application to committee design
• Introduction to the special issue on unawareness
• On games without approximate equilibria
• Information flows and memory in games
• Hyperbolic consensus games
• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• Cognitive limits and preferences for information
• Speculation under unawareness
• The value of information in risk-sharing environments with unawareness
• Sequential trading with coarse contingencies
• The value of information under unawareness
• AU introspection and symmetry under non-trivial unawareness
• On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets
• Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
• On the axiomatization of an unawareness structure from knowing-whether operators
• Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs
• The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces

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