Game theory without partitions, and applications to speculation and consensus

DOI10.1515/bejte-2019-0010MaRDI QIDQ2099073

John D. Geanakoplos

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B. E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0010

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledge; speculation; agreement; betting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B06: Decision theory

91A18: Games in extensive form

Related Items

Cognitive limits and preferences for information, The value of information in risk-sharing environments with unawareness, The value of information under unawareness, Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures, Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors, Speculation under unawareness, Introduction to the special issue on unawareness, Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs

Cites Work

• Learning to agree
• Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
• The revelation of information in strategic market games. A critique of rational expectations equilibrium
• Information, trade and common knowledge
• We can't disagree forever
• Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• A note on 'fulfilled expectations' equilibria
• Agreeing to disagree
• Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree
• Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
• Common Knowledge of an Aggregate of Expectations
• Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information
• On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations