Game theory without partitions, and applications to speculation and consensus

DOI10.1515/BEJTE-2019-0010OpenAlexW3174342411MaRDI QIDQ2099073FDOQ2099073

Authors: John D. Geanakoplos 

Publication date: 22 November 2022

Published in: The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0010

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zbMATH Keywords

agreementcommon knowledgespeculationbetting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cites Work

• Information, trade and common knowledge
• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Agreeing to disagree
• Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge
• We can't disagree forever
• Learning to agree
• On the Possibility of Speculation under Rational Expectations
• A note on 'fulfilled expectations' equilibria
• Ignoring ignorance and agreeing to disagree
• The revelation of information in strategic market games. A critique of rational expectations equilibrium
• Common Knowledge of an Aggregate of Expectations
• Don't Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information
• Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
• Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information

Cited In (17)

• A nonspeculation theorem with an application to committee design
• Introduction to the special issue on unawareness
• Information flows and memory in games
• On games without approximate equilibria
• Hyperbolic consensus games
• Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors
• Cognitive limits and preferences for information
• Speculation under unawareness
• The value of information in risk-sharing environments with unawareness
• Sequential trading with coarse contingencies
• The value of information under unawareness
• AU introspection and symmetry under non-trivial unawareness
• On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets
• Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
• On the axiomatization of an unawareness structure from knowing-whether operators
• Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs
• The existence of universal qualitative belief spaces

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