The revelation of information in strategic market games. A critique of rational expectations equilibrium
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Publication:1099055
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(87)90002-4zbMath0637.90016OpenAlexW1513038709WikidataQ110908820 ScholiaQ110908820MaRDI QIDQ1099055
Pradeep Dubey, Martin Shubik, John D. Geanakoplos
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(87)90002-4
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
Related Items (32)
Cooperative processing of information via choice at an information set ⋮ Nash competitive equilibria and two-period fund separation ⋮ Incomplete markets and individual risks ⋮ Dynamic price formation in a futures market via double auctions ⋮ Switching from complete to incomplete information ⋮ Bayesian learning behaviour and the stability of equilibrium forecasts ⋮ Boom-bust dynamics in a stock market participation model with heterogeneous traders ⋮ Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations ⋮ Information acquisition and welfare effect in a model of competitive financial markets ⋮ An in-depth analysis of information markets with aggregate uncertainty ⋮ Corrigendum to ``Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations ⋮ Information and strategic behavior ⋮ Evolutionary finance and dynamic games ⋮ Strategic market games: an introduction. ⋮ Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations in large markets. ⋮ Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets. ⋮ Information aggregation in a large multi-stage market game ⋮ Speculation and price fluctuations with private, extrinsic signals ⋮ Incomplete markets, allocative efficiency, and the information revealed by prices ⋮ A strategic market game with a mutual bank with fractional reserves and redemption in gold. A continuum of traders ⋮ Endogenous differential information ⋮ The market game: Existence and structure of equilibrium ⋮ Incentive compatible self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations ⋮ Functional rational expectations equilibria in market games ⋮ Large market games with demand uncertainty. ⋮ Informed trading and the `leakage' of information ⋮ Self-fulfilling mechanisms in Bayesian games ⋮ Computation in a distributed information market ⋮ Game theory without partitions, and applications to speculation and consensus ⋮ Updating awareness and information aggregation ⋮ Noncooperative exchange using money and broker-dealers ⋮ A battle of informed traders and the market game foundations for rational expectations equilibrium
Cites Work
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