Information acquisition and welfare effect in a model of competitive financial markets

DOI10.1007/s00199-012-0711-5zbMath1386.91089MaRDI QIDQ372365

Xiaojuan Hu, Cheng-Zhong Qin

Publication date: 7 October 2013

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0711-5

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimality; information acquisition; market efficiency; fully revealing REE; Grossman paradox

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B52: Special types of economic equilibria

91B44: Economics of information

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• An Introduction to the Theory of Rational Expectations Under Asymmetric Information