A theory of money and financial institutions. 28. The noncooperative equilibria of a closed trading economy with market supply and bidding strategles
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Publication:1249515
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(78)90119-9zbMath0385.90020OpenAlexW2060177180MaRDI QIDQ1249515
Publication date: 1978
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90119-9
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Cites Work
- A closed economy with exogenous uncertainty, different levels of information, money, futures and spot markets
- Noncooperative general exchange with a continuum of traders: Two models
- Trade and Prices in a Closed Economy with Exogeneous Uncertainty, Different Levels of Information, Money and Compound Futures Markets
