Atomic Leontievian Cournotian traders are always Walrasian

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.05.004MaRDI QIDQ2195706zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Ludovic A. Julien

Publication date 27 August 2020

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.05.004

zbMATH Keywords

Cournot-Nash equilibriumLeontievian preferencesWalras equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Recommendations

• Atomic Leontievian Walrasian traders are always Cournotian
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• Existence and optimality of Cournot-Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part
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• Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders and a strongly connected set of commodities

Cites work

• A strategic market game with complete markets
• A theory of money and financial institutions. 28. The noncooperative equilibria of a closed trading economy with market supply and bidding strategles
• Atomic Cournotian traders may be Walrasian
• Comparative statics in a simple class of strategic market games
• Cournot-Nash equilibria in limit exchange economies with complete markets and consistent prices
• Exchange market equilibria with Leontief's utility: freedom of pricing leads to rationality
• Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders
• Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders and a strongly connected set of commodities
• Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Stable trading structures in bilateral oligopolies
• Strategic market games: an introduction.
• The complexity of equilibria: Hardness results for economies via a correspondence with games
• The non-cooperative equilibria of a trading economy with complete markets and consistent prices
• The strategic Marshallian cross
• Trade fragmentation and coordination in strategic market games

Cited in

(6)

• Atomic Leontievian Walrasian traders are always Cournotian
• Existence and optimality of Cournot-Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part
• On preferences and taxation mechanisms in strategic bilateral exchange
• Cournotian duopolistic firms may be Walrasian: a case in the Gabszewicz and Vial model
• Noncooperative oligopoly equilibrium in markets with hierarchical competition
• Atomic Cournotian traders may be Walrasian

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