Recommendations
- Atomic Leontievian Walrasian traders are always Cournotian
- Atomic Leontievian Cournotian traders are always Walrasian
- Existence and optimality of Cournot-Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part
- Cournot-Walras equilibria in markets with a continuum of traders
- Cournot-Walras and Cournot equilibria in mixed markets: A comparison
Cites work
- An Equivalence Theorem for the Core of an Economy Whose Atoms Are Not "Too" Big
- Comparative statics in a simple class of strategic market games
- Cournot-Nash equilibria in limit exchange economies with complete markets and consistent prices
- Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders
- Oligopoly in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Stable trading structures in bilateral oligopolies
- Strategic market games: an introduction.
- The non-cooperative equilibria of a trading economy with complete markets and consistent prices
- The strategic Marshallian cross
- Trade fragmentation and coordination in strategic market games
Cited in
(8)- Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders
- Atomic Leontievian Cournotian traders are always Walrasian
- Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders and a strongly connected set of commodities
- Atomic Leontievian Walrasian traders are always Cournotian
- Existence and optimality of Cournot-Nash equilibria in a bilateral oligopoly with atoms and an atomless part
- Cournot-Walras equilibria in markets with a continuum of traders
- Cournotian duopolistic firms may be Walrasian: a case in the Gabszewicz and Vial model
- Arbitrage pricing in non-Walrasian financial markets
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