An Equivalence Theorem for the Core of an Economy Whose Atoms Are Not "Too" Big

Related Items (23)

Coalitional fair allocations in smooth mixed markets with an atomless sector ⋮ Values and cores of fuzzy games with infinitely many players ⋮ On exploitation in a class of differentiable mixed markets ⋮ Strict fairness of equilibria in asymmetric information economies and mixed markets ⋮ The no-surplus condition as a characterization of perfectly competitive equilibrium ⋮ The Walrasian objection mechanism and Mas-Colell's bargaining set in economies with many commodities ⋮ Atomic Cournotian traders may be Walrasian ⋮ Absence of envy among ``neighbors can be enough ⋮ Fairness and formation rules of coalitions ⋮ Some notes on the core of a production economy with some large traders and a continuum of small traders ⋮ Ex-post core, fine core and rational expectations equilibrium allocations ⋮ A limit theorem on the core ⋮ Coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the set of competitive equilibria in a continuum coalition production economy ⋮ Star-shapedness of Richter-Aumann integral on a measure space with atoms: theory and economic applications ⋮ A model of equilibrium with differentiated commodities ⋮ On the formation of unions in \(n\)-person games ⋮ Preference aggregation and atoms in measures ⋮ Disadvantageous monopolies and disadvantageous endowments ⋮ OLIGOPOLY AND COST SHARING IN ECONOMIES WITH PUBLIC GOODS ⋮ Fairness and fuzzy coalitions ⋮ Cone conditions in oligopolistic market models. ⋮ An introduction to perfect and imperfect competition via bilateral oligopoly ⋮ A price-setting game with a nonatomic fringe.

This page was built for publication: An Equivalence Theorem for the Core of an Economy Whose Atoms Are Not "Too" Big